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1. INTRODUCTION 
Concepts and meaning are fundamental components of nearly all aspects of human cognition. We use 
this knowledge every day to recognize entities and objects in our environment, anticipate how they will 
behave and interact with each other, use them to perform functions, to generate expectancies for 
situations, and to interpret language. This general knowledge of meaning falls within the realm of 
semantic memory. For many years, semantic memory was viewed as an amodal, modular memory store 
for factual information about concepts, distinct from episodic memory (our memory for specific 
instances of personal experience). However, researchers now interpret semantic memory more broadly 
to refer to general world knowledge, entangled in experience, and dependent on culture. Furthermore, 
there is now considerable evidence suggesting that semantic memory is grounded in the sensory 
modalities, is distributed across brain regions, and depends on episodic memories at least in terms of 
learning, with the possibility that there is no definite line between episodic and semantic memory. In 
this chapter, we review contemporary research in semantic memory. We limit our discussion to lexical 
semantics (the meaning of individual words), with particular focus on recent findings and trends, 
formal computational models, neural organization, and future directions. 
 
1.1. Classic View of Semantic Memory 
Tulving (1972) viewed memory as a system of independent modules. Long-term memory was 
subdivided into declarative (facts) and procedural (skills) components. Declarative memory was further 
divided into semantic memory and episodic memory, with a clear distinction between them. Tulving 
characterized semantic memory as amodal. In an amodal view, when one thinks of an apple, the 
information retrieved from semantic memory is independent of the sensory modalities used to perceive 
an apple. Although semantic memory contains factual information about an apple’s color and taste, this 
information is dissociated from the sensory systems used to actually see or taste. 
Early neuropsychological evidence supported Tulving’s (1972) view. For example, amnesic 
patients showed dissociations between episodic and semantic memory tasks (Squire, 1988); their 
impairment seemed to have little effect on semantic memory despite profound episodic deficiencies, 
bolstering the modularity claim. Research on ‘schema abstraction’ tasks found that the decay of 
episodic and semantic memory followed different profiles (Posner & Keele, 1968). Although memory 
for episodes is stronger than for category prototypes immediately after training, episodic memory 
decays much faster than semantic memory (or at least, instances decay faster than do abstract 
prototypes). 
Tulving’s (1972) characterization of semantic memory as an amodal, modular system separate 
from episodic and procedural memory provided a useful foundation to study and understand human 
semantic representations. In retrospect, however, it may have actually stifled research in semantics by 
imposing a rigid framework that is unlikely to be correct. Recent research with improved experimental, 
computational, and neuroimaging techniques clearly contradicts the classic view. Semantic memory is 
now viewed more broadly as a part of an integrated memory system, grounded in the sensory, 
perceptual, and motor systems, and is distributed across key brain regions. 
 
2. GROUNDING SEMANTIC MEMORY 
Tulving’s classic view of semantic memory as an amodal symbolic store has been challenged by 
contemporary research. There is a growing body of behavioral and neuroimaging research 
demonstrating that when humans access word meaning, they automatically activate sensorimotor 
information used to perceive and act on the real-world objects and relations to which a word refers. In 
theories of grounded cognition, the meaning of a word is grounded in the sensorimotor systems 
(Barsalou, 1999; see Pecher & Zwann, 2005, for a review). Hence, when one thinks of an apple, 
knowledge regarding motoric grasping, chewing, sights, sounds, and tastes used to encode episodic 
experiences of an apple are reinstated via sensorimotor simulation. Thus, a grounded simulation refers 
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to context-specific re-activations that incorporate the important aspects of episodic experience into a 
current representation. In this sense, simulations are guided and only partial (Barsalou, 2008). This 
approach challenges amodal views, and makes a clear link between episodic experience and semantic 
memory. 
A wealth of recent behavioral evidence supports the grounded simulation approach to semantics. 
For example, response latencies for images and feature names are faster when they have visual 
properties congruent with context (Solomon & Barsalou, 2001; Zwann, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). 
Similarly, having participants perform particular motions (e.g., grasping) facilitates the comprehension 
of sentences describing actions involving these motions (Klatzky et al., 1989), and prime-target pairs 
sharing motor-manipulation features (e.g., typewriter-piano) are responded to more quickly than pairs 
that do not (Myun, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). Zwann and Madden (2005) review numerous studies 
suggesting that the mental representations activated during comprehension also include information 
about object features, temporal and spatial perspective, and spatial iconicity. Barsalou (2008) and 
Pecher, Boot, and Van Danzig (2011) contain surveys of the recent literature attesting to the 
importance of situation models, simulation (perceptual, motor, and affective), and gesture in language 
comprehension and abstract concepts. 
 
3. SEMANTIC ORGANIZATION IN THE BRAIN 
Semantic memory research was for many years dominated by cognitive psychologists who generally 
were not concerned with neural organization. In cognitive neuropsychology, there is a history of studies 
investigating patients with semantic deficits (Warrington & Shallice, 1984). However, for a number of 
years, this line of research was divorced from semantic memory research using normal adult 
participants. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, fMRI in particular, research on the neural 
organization of semantic memory blossomed. 
Researchers have long known that brain regions responsible for perception tend to be specialized 
for specific sensory modalities. Given that perception is distributed across specialized neural regions, 
one possibility is that conceptual representations are organized in a similar fashion. For the past 40 
years, Paivio (1971) has advocated a form of modality-specific representations in his dual-coding 
theory. Furthermore, studies of patients with category-specific semantic deficits have been used as a 
basis for arguing for multimodal representations for the past 25 years or so. In early work, Warrington 
and McCarthy (1987) put forward their sensory/functional theory to account for patterns of category 
specific impairments of knowledge in patients with focal brain damage. The basic assumption is that 
living things depend primarily on visual knowledge, whereas although visual knowledge is also 
important for nonliving things, knowledge of an object’s function is primary. Building on Allport 
(1985), recent research has used analyses of large scale feature production norms to extend the sensory-
functional theory to other senses and types of knowledge, and move beyond the binary living-nonliving 
distinction (Cree & McRae, 2003). There do remain some accounts of category-specific semantic 
deficits that are amodal (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998, Tyler & Moss, 2001), but even these researchers 
have begun to find support for theories in which knowledge is tied to modality-specific brain areas 
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2003; Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009). 
The behavioral and neuropsychological evidence in favor of grounded semantics is corroborated 
by recent neuroimaging studies supporting a distributed multimodal system. A few researchers have 
used evoked response potentials to investigate this issue (Sitnikova, West, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 
2006), but the vast majority of studies have used fMRI. For example, Goldberg, Perfetti, and Schneider 
(2006) tied together previously reported neuroimaging evidence supporting modally bound tactile, 
colour, auditory, and gustatory representations. They found that sensory brain areas for each modality 
are recruited during a feature verification task using linguistic stimuli (e.g., banana-yellow). The same 
pattern emerges in single word processing. Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) showed that 
reading action words correlates with activation in somatotopically corresponding areas of the motor 
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cortex (lick activates tongue regions while kick activates foot regions), indicating that word meaning is 
modally distributed across brain regions. Furthermore, within brain regions that encode modality-
specific, possibly feature-based representations, some studies suggest a category-based organization 
(Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999). Finally, some studies have shown that semantic representations are 
located just anterior to primary perceptual or motor areas, whereas others have found evidence for 
activation of primary areas (see Thompson-Schill, 2003). In summary, there is a large amount of 
converging evidence supporting a distributed multimodal semantic system (for thorough reviews, see 
Binder, 2009; Martin, 2007). 
Perhaps one the most important remaining issues concerns the fact that people’s concepts are not 
experienced as a jumble of features, disjointed across space and time, but instead are experienced as 
coherent unified wholes. Multimodal feature-based theories therefore need to include a solution to the 
binding problem, specifying how representational elements are integrated into conceptual wholes, both 
within and between modalities. One solution involves temporal synchrony of neuronal firing rates (von 
der Malsburg, 1999). Semantic representations may be integrated by coincidental firing rates of 
distributed neural populations. However, the most frequently invoked solution is based on the idea of a 
convergence zone, which can be considered as a set of processing units that encode coincidental 
activity among multiple input units (Damasio, 1989). In connectionist models, a convergence zone may 
be thought of as a hidden layer (Rogers et al., 2004). Because they encode time-locked activation 
patterns, an important property of convergence zones is that they transform their input, rather than just 
repeat signals. In this way, successive convergence zones build more complex or abstract 
representations. Current theories of multimodal semantic representations incorporate either single 
convergence zones, as in Patterson, Nestor, and Rogers’ (2007) anterior temporal lobe hub theory, or a 
hierarchy of convergence zones encoding information over successively more complex configurations 
of modalities (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). At the moment, it is unclear which of these hypotheses is 
correct. 
In summary, recent research supports the idea that semantic representations are grounded across 
modality-specific brain regions. Researchers are working toward fleshing out details of precisely what 
these regions encode, the degree to which sub-regions are specific to types of concepts, and how 
semantic representations are experienced as unified wholes. Furthermore, the vast majority of research 
has been conducted on concrete concepts, so research on other concepts, such as verbs or abstract 
concepts, will play a key role over the next few years. 
 
4. EVENT-BASED SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS 
Another way in which the semantic-episodic distinction has been blurred in recent years concerns 
research on event-based knowledge in semantic memory. People’s knowledge of common everyday 
events includes actions that are part of those events, and common primary participants or components, 
such as agents (the people doing the action), patients (the people or objects upon which the action is 
performed), instruments involved in actions, and locations at which various events take part. 
Furthermore, people have knowledge of temporal aspects of events. This generalized event knowledge 
is learned through our experience with everyday events, watching television and movies, and reading 
and hearing about what people have done, what they are doing, and what they are going to do. 
Language provides many cues into event knowledge. For example, verbs like travel or cook denote 
events and actions, some nouns like breakfast refer to events, and other nouns refer to entities or 
objects that typically play a role in specific situations, such as waitress, customer, fork, or cafeteria. A 
number of studies have shown that such event knowledge is computed rapidly from single words. 
These experiments have tended to use a priming paradigm with a short stimulus onset asynchony 
(SOA: the time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target), which is viewed as 
providing a window into the organization of semantic memory. 
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Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, and Marslen-Wilson (1995) showed priming effects based on instrument 
relations (such as broom-floor) and what they called script relations, in which the primes were a 
mixture of events and locations (hospital-doctor and war-army). Subsequent studies have shown that 
verbs prime their typical agents (arresting-cop), patients (serving-customer), and instruments (stirred-
spoon), but not locations (skated-arena; Ferretti, McRae, & Hatherell, 2001). Furthermore, typical 
agents, patients, instruments, and locations prime verbs (McRae, Hare, Elman, & Ferretti, 2005). In 
addition, Hare, Jones, Thomson, Kelly, and McRae (2009) showed that event nouns prime the types of 
people and things commonly found at those events (sale-shopper, breakfast-eggs), location nouns 
prime entities and objects typically found at those locations (stable-horse, sandbox-shovel), and 
instrument nouns prime the types of things on which they typically are used (key-door) but not the 
people who typically use them (hose-gardener, although priming was found in the other direction). 
Hare et al. used a corpus-based model, BEAGLE (Jones, Kintsch, & Mewhort, 2006) to simulate their 
results. 
Chwilla and Kolk (2005) showed that people can integrate words rapidly to construct situations, 
thus producing priming. They presented two words simultaneously that were unrelated except when 
considered in the context of some broader event (director bribe), and demonstrated priming of a third 
word (dismissal) related to the situation. Chwilla and Kolk’s results depend on conceptually integrating 
both primes with the target, thus speaking to rapid activation of knowledge of situations. In addition, 
Khalkhali, Wammes, and McRae (2011) found that relatedness decision latencies were shorter when 
three events were presented in the order corresponding to their usual real-world sequence (marinate-
grill-chew) than when the order of the first two events was reversed (grill-marinate-chew), suggesting 
that such temporal information is encoded in semantic memory. 
An interesting consequence of these studies is that they move toward a stronger tie between 
semantic memory and sentence comprehension. For example, a number of the studies used thematic 
roles of verbs as the basis for testing relations, thus making direct contact with a key construct in 
sentence processing research. Along this same line, Jones and Love (2007) provide a point of contact 
between sentence processing and how people learn lexical concepts. Participants studied sentences 
such as The polar bear chases the seal and The German shepherd chases the cat. In a test phase, 
similarity ratings for entities and objects participating in common relational systems increased. The 
increase was largest for objects playing the same role within a relation (e.g., the chaser), but also was 
present for those playing different roles in the same relation (e.g., the chaser or the chasee role in the 
chase relation), and this happened regardless of whether they participated in the same sentence/event. 
In summary, recent studies have investigated people’s episodic-based knowledge of common 
generalized events. These studies show that semantic memory is organized so that this knowledge is 
computed and used rapidly, and they demonstrate direct links between episodic and semantic memory. 
 
5. SEMANTIC AND ASSOCIATIVE RELATIONS 
There are longstanding issues in semantic memory research regarding associative versus semantic 
relations. Association has a long history in psychology and philosophy, and normative word association 
has often been used to explain performance in semantic memory experiments (Nelson, McEvoy, & 
Dennis, 2000; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Bower (2000) defined associations as 
“sensations that are experienced contiguously in time and/or space. The memory that sensory quality or 
event A was experienced together with, or immediately preceding, sensory quality or event B is 
recorded in the memory bank as an association from idea a to idea b." (p. 3). In 1965, Deese stated that 
“almost all the basic propositions of current association theory derive from the sequential nature of 
events in human experience” (p. 1). More recently, Moss et al. (1995) claimed that associations 
between words are “built up through repeated co-occurrence of the two word forms.” (p. 864). In 
general, the consensus seems to be that contiguity is key to forming a link between two concepts. 
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In contrast, association in cognitive psychology almost invariably is defined in terms of its 
operationalization. In a word association task, a participant hears or reads a stimulus word and 
produces the first word that comes to mind (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). Thus, two words are 
associated if one is produced as a response to the other. There exist significant discrepancies between 
the definition of association and its operationalization. Association is learning-based whereas word 
association is production-based. Association is based on sensory information whereas word association 
is linguistically-based. Association is based on contiguity, whereas word associations are virtually 
always meaningful. 
The construct of semantic relatedness was for a long time limited to exemplars from the same 
category, or featurally-similar concepts (as in cow-horse; Lupker, 1984; Frenck-Mestre & Bueno, 
1999). Recently, however, researchers have investigated a much wider array of relations. The event-
based relations discussed in Section 4 are examples. In addition, researchers have been studying what 
are often called thematic relations (see Estes, Golonka, & Jones, 2011, for a recent review). These 
include, for example, cow-milk, where a cow produces milk, or wind-erosion, where wind causes 
erosion. 
A thorny issue concerns delineating between the influences of semantic and associative 
relatedness. Lucas (2000) concluded from a meta-analysis of priming experiments that “pure” semantic 
priming (in the absence of word association) exists, whereas there is no evidence for association-based 
priming in the absence of semantic relatedness. In contrast, Hutchinson (2003) reviewed individual 
studies and concluded that both semantic and associative relatedness produce priming. One possibility 
is that it may not be fruitful to distinguish between associative and semantic relations because word 
associations are best understood in terms of semantic relations (Anisfeld & Knapp, 1968; Brainerd et 
al., 2008). In some views, the word association task unambiguously taps associative connections 
between words/concepts in people’s semantic memory. In contrast, word association can be considered 
an open-ended task on which performance is driven almost exclusively by types of semantic relations. 
Researchers who have classified word associates according to their semantic relations have shown that 
almost all stimulus-response pairs, with the exception of rhymes, have clear semantic relations (Guida 
& Lenci, 2007). Furthermore, Brainerd et al. found that a number of semantic variables correlate with 
word association strength. 
This is likely the primary reason why it has been so difficult to distinguish empirically between 
associative and semantic relations. In studies of associative priming, the items are a mixture of 
semantic relations, such as hammer-nail or engine-car. McNamara (2005) stated the issue clearly: 
“Having devoted a fair amount of time perusing free-association norms, I challenge anyone to find two 
highly associated words that are not semantically related in some plausible way. Under this view, the 
distinction between purely semantically and associatively related words is an artificial categorization of 
an underlying continuum.” (p. 86). Furthermore, in studies of pure semantic relatedness priming, items 
that appear in word association norms are excluded. However, it does not appear to make sense to 
argue that items in these studies are not associated in the general sense. For example, Hare et al. (2009) 
analyzed subsets of stimuli not associated according to word association norms, showing priming in the 
absence of association. This logic appears at first glance to be valid because concepts such as sale and 
shopper are not associated according to Nelson et al.’s (1998) norms. However, shoppers are found at 
sales, and the entire point of a sale is to attract shoppers. So, these concepts definitely are associated in 
the general sense, even though forward and backward association statistics indicate that they are not. 
The line between association and semantics has now been questioned in a number of areas of 
research. McRae, Khalkhali, and Hare (in press) discuss this issue with respect to research using the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm, picture-word facilitation and interference, the 
development of associative learning through adolescence, and semantic priming. Although association 
is a critical aspect of learning, one possibility is that virtually all retained associations are meaningful 
and thus can be understood in terms of semantic relations. On the other hand, given longstanding views 
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on the primacy of association-based links in memory (as indexed by normative word association), this 
debate is likely to continue. 
 
6. ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 
The structure and content of abstract concepts such as lucky, advise, and boredom have been studied to 
a much lesser extent than have concrete concepts, and thus are not nearly as well understood. In 
general, there is little consensus regarding how abstract concepts are represented and computed. The 
lack of obvious physical referents in the world for abstract concepts makes theorizing, model building, 
and experiment quite difficult, but also an important and intriguing issue. We use the phrase “obvious 
physical referents” in the previous sentence because many abstract concepts are at least partly 
experienced by the senses, or have internal states that correspond to them. For example, we have all 
experienced boredom, we have internal thoughts and emotions that are tied to the meaning of boredom, 
and we can visually recognize boredom in other people. 
The most influential theory has been Paivio’s (1971; 2007) dual-coding theory, in which the 
processing of lexical concepts involves the activation of functionally independent but interconnected 
verbal and nonverbal representational systems. The verbal system consists of associatively 
interconnected linguistically-based units, whereas the nonverbal system consists of spatially-organized 
representations of objects and events that can be experienced as mental images. Activation spreads 
within and between systems. Concrete concepts are represented in both systems, whereas abstract 
concepts are represented in the verbal system only. Dual-coding theory has been used to explain 
differences between concrete and abstract words in memory tasks, lexical decision, EEG, and fMRI 
experiments. 
Dual-coding theory is contrasted frequently with context-availability theory, in which the major 
difference between abstract and concrete concepts is that abstract words and sentences are more 
difficult to comprehend because it is challenging to access relevant world knowledge contextual 
information when comprehending abstract materials (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). At present, 
however, dual-coding theory has received much more support. 
The vast majority of experiments on abstract concepts compare performance on concrete versus 
abstract words, either in isolation or in sentence contexts. A consistent finding is that memory is better 
for concrete concepts (Paivio, 2007). A number of studies have also found shorter lexical decision 
latencies to concrete than to abstract words in isolation (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983), and a larger 
N400 to concrete words (Kounios & Holcomb, 1994). Some patients have been reported with better 
performance on concrete concepts (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall, 1980). However, a frustrating 
aspect of this research is that, although the memory results are stable, some studies show shorter lexical 
decision latencies to abstract words (Kousta et al., 2011), and some patients perform better on abstract 
concepts (Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994). In addition, there is no compelling explanation for the 
N400 results. Finally, the fMRI literature on concrete versus abstract concepts has produced highly 
variable results (Grossman et al., 2002; Kiehl et al., 1999; Wise et al., 2000). 
There are at least two reasons for the inconsistency in results. First, some differences may be task 
related because the manner in which people process words influences the form of concrete-abstract 
differences. Second, there may be important differences among item sets across studies. Typically, 
researchers select concrete and abstract words using concreteness and/or imageability ratings. 
However, the categories of concrete and abstract concepts are large, and selecting small subsets from 
these large classes has presumably led to inconsistent results. To deal with this issue, researchers have 
begun to classify abstract words on further dimensions, such as emotional valence (Kousta et al., 2011). 
More recent theories of the structure and content of abstract concepts have emerged. In Barsalou’s 
(1999) perceptual simulation theory, abstract and concrete concepts can be simulated from prior 
experience. One issue involves the type of simulations that might be key to abstract concepts that do 
not, at least at first glance, have sensory-motor correspondences. Barsalou and Weimer-Hastings 
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(2005) focused on situations as the key to abstract concepts. Concepts such as lucky, advise, and 
boredom are tied both to situations in which people have learned the meaning of those concepts, and to 
internally generated cognitive and emotional states. At present, however, little research has been 
conducted to flesh out these ideas. 
One other prominent theory of abstract concepts is conceptual metaphor or image schema theory 
(Lakoff, 1987). In this view, abstract concepts are mapped to sensory-motor grounded image schemas. 
For example, studies suggest that the abstract concept of time is grounded in our knowledge of space 
(Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). At the moment, however, the notion of a conceptual metaphor or 
image schema is inconsistent among theorists (Pecher et al., 2011). 
A promising avenue for studying abstract concepts comes from corpus-based distributional 
models. One advantage of corpus-based models is that they provide representations for all types of 
words using the same computational mechanisms. As described in Section 7.3, these models can also 
be combined with other approaches to form hybrids. 
In summary, understanding the organization and content of abstract concepts is a major challenge 
for all current theories of semantic memory. Addressing the relevant issues will require a deeper 
appreciation of the similarities and differences among types of abstract concepts, how abstract concepts 
depend differentially on sensory, motor, and internally-generated cognition and emotional information, 
and the degree to which they are tied to situations or contexts in which they are important. 
 
7. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SEMANTIC MEMORY 
There is a fuzzy boundary in the literature between models of semantic processing and semantic 
representation. We define the former to be models of how learned semantic structure is used in tasks, 
and the latter to be models that specify a mechanism by which semantic memory is formed from 
experience. We first review models of semantic processing, and then models of learning semantic 
structure from experience (primarily corpus-based models). However, we acknowledge that this 
distinction between the two ‘levels’ of models is an oversimplification: How we learn new semantic 
information depends on the current contents of semantic memory, and semantic structure and process 
influence each other when explaining behavioral data (Johns & Jones, 2010). 
 
7.1. Models of Semantic Processing 
Connectionist networks have been used to provide insight into how word meaning is represented 
and computed, and to simulate numerous empirical semantic memory phenomena. In these models, 
concepts are typically represented as distributed patterns of activity across sets of representational units 
that often represent features (<has 4 legs>), but not necessarily nameable ones. Units are organized into 
layers, and are connected by weighted connections. These connections control processing, and their 
weights are established using a learning algorithm. 
The impact of connectionist models has been at least four-fold. First, due to distributed 
representations, they naturally encode concept similarity in terms of shared units, and thus simulate 
similarity-based phenomena (Cree et al., 1999; Masson, 1995; Plaut & Booth, 2000). Second, because 
they learn statistical regularities between and within patterns, they have led researchers to focus on the 
distributional statistics underlying semantic representations and computations (Tyler & Moss, 2001; 
McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997). Third, because many connectionist models settle into 
representations over time (e.g., attractor networks), they can be used to simulate response latencies, and 
provide insight into the temporal dynamics of computing word meaning (Masson, 1995). Fourth, one 
can train a model and then damage it in various ways, thus simulating brain-damaged patients (Hinton 
& Shallice, 1991; Plaut & Shallice, 1993; Rogers et al., 2004). Finally, all of these properties of 
connectionist models are interrelated. 
Semantic processing unfolds over time. When we read or hear a word, components of meaning 
become active at different rates over the first several hundred milliseconds. Attractor networks, in 
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which units update their states continuously based on both their prior states and input from other units, 
are well suited to simulate this process. Because priming has played such a large role in semantic 
memory research, a number of researchers have simulated it. Given that similar concepts have 
overlapping distributed representations, connectionist networks have been successful at simulating 
priming between featurally-similar concepts such as eagle and hawk, providing insight into factors such 
as correlations among semantic features and the degree of similarity between concepts (Cree et al., 
1999; McRae et al., 1997). Furthermore, researchers have simulated contiguity-based (associative) 
priming, and individual differences in priming (Masson, 1995; Plaut & Booth, 2000). 
One way in which distributional statistics underlying semantic representations have been studied is 
the feature verification task, in which participants judge whether a feature such as <has an engine> is 
reasonably true of a concept such as van. These studies and accompanying simulations have 
highlighted the role of correlational structure. That is, some features tend to occur with others across 
basic-level concepts, such as <has feathers> and <has a beak>, and there is a continuum of the feature 
correlational strength. Studies such as McRae et al. (1997) and Randall et al. (2004) show that 
connectionist models predict influences of feature correlations that are observed in human data. 
Furthermore, the degree to which features are distinctive (the inverse of the number of concepts in 
which a feature occurs) plays a privileged role in semantic computations in both people and 
connectionist simulations (Cree et al., 2006; Randall et al., 2004). Distributional statistics such as these 
are bases for theories such as the conceptual structure account (Tyler & Moss, 2001), and are also 
strongly implicated in understanding data from category-specific deficits and semantic dementia 
patients (Rogers et al., 2004; Tyler & Moss). Finally, they may form the basis for understanding how 
superordinate categories such as clothing and fruit are learned and computed (O’Connor, Cree, & 
McRae, 2009). 
Much of the research on simulating neurally-impaired adults has drawn on work by Hinton and 
Shallice (1993) and Plaut and Shallice (1993). A nice example is Rogers and colleagues’ work in which 
they provide detailed accounts of semantic dementia patients (Rogers et al., 2004; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004). Rogers et al. damaged a trained attractor network, and then simulated patient 
performance in a number of tasks. For example, they showed that loss of knowledge followed a 
specific-to-general trajectory because of the nature in which regularities across visual and verbal 
patterns are stored in their model’s hidden units. Features that were shared and correlated across 
numerous concepts tended to be represented in larger and more neighboring regions of semantic space 
than were highly distinctive features. Thus, distinctive features were more likely to be influenced by 
damage, so the model showed a tendency to lose its ability to discriminate among similar concepts 
early in the course of semantic dementia. 
Finally, Rogers and McClelland (2004) present a large set of arguments and simulations in which, 
among other things, they provide connectionist accounts of several phenomena that have been 
highlighted in knowledge-based theories of concepts. The issues are too complex and numerous to do 
them justice in a short paragraph, but their book is highly recommended. 
 
7.2 Models of Semantic Representation 
Classic models of semantic structure assumed that meaning was represented either as a hierarchical 
network of interconnected nodes (Collins and Quillian, 1969) or as arrays of binary features (Smith, 
Shoben, & Rips, 1974). A major limitation of both these early models is that neither specifies how their 
representations are learned. Instead, their representations must be hand coded by the researcher or 
collected from adult participants. 
More recent distributional models specify cognitive mechanisms for constructing semantic 
representations from statistical experience with text corpora. In general, these models are all based on 
the distributional hypothesis (Harris, 1970): Words that appear in similar linguistic contexts are likely 
to have related meanings. For example, apple may frequently co-occur with seed, worm, and core. As a 
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result, the model can infer that these words are related. In addition, the model can induce that apple is 
similar to peach even if the two never directly co-occur, because they occur around the same types of 
words. In contrast, apple and staple rarely appear in the same or similar contexts. 
There are a large number of distributional models (for reviews, see Bullinaria & Levy 2007; 
Riordan & Jones, 2011). To simplify discussion, we classify them into three families based on their 
learning mechanism: 1) latent inference models, 2) passive co-occurrence models, and 3) retrieval-
based models. For an in-depth review of new advances in distributional modeling, we refer readers to 
the recent pair of special issues of Topics in Cognitive Science, (2011). 
 
7.2.1. Latent Inference Models. This family of models reverse-engineers the cognitive variables 
responsible for how words co-occur across linguistic contexts. The process is similar to other types of 
latent inference in psychology. For example, personality psychologists commonly administer structured 
questionnaires, constructing items to tap hypothetical psychological constructs. Singular value 
decomposition (SVD) is applied to the pattern of responses over questionnaire items to infer the latent 
psychological variables responsible for the cross-item response patterns. Latent inference models of 
semantic memory work in an analogous way, but they apply this decomposition to the pattern of word 
co-occurrences over documents in a corpus. 
The best-known latent inference model is Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 
1997). LSA begins with a word-by-document frequency matrix from a text corpus. Each word is 
weighted relative to its entropy over documents; ‘promiscuous’ words appearing in many contexts are 
dampened more than are ‘monogamous’ words that appear more faithfully in particular contexts. 
Finally, the matrix is factored using SVD, and only the components with the largest eigenvalues are 
retained (typically 300-400). These are the latent semantic components that best explain how words co-
occur over documents, similar to the way that the psychological constructs of introversion and 
extroversion might explain response patterns over hundreds of questionnaire items. With this reduced 
representation, each word in the corpus is represented as a pattern over latent variables. In the reduced 
space, indirect relationships emerge—even though two words may never have directly co-occurred in a 
document (e.g., two synonyms), they can have similar patterns. 
Landauer and Dumais (1997) suggested that the human brain performs some data reduction 
operation similar to SVD on contextual experience to construct semantic representations. However, 
they were careful not to claim that what the brain does is exactly SVD on a perfectly remembered item-
by-episode representation of experience. Whether or not LSA is a plausible model of human semantic 
representation (for criticisms, see Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Perfetti, 1998), it has been remarkably 
successful at accounting for data ranging from human performance on synonymy tests (Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997) to metaphor comprehension (Kintsch, 2000). LSA set the stage for future distributional 
models to better study the specific mechanisms that might produce a reduced semantic space. In 
addition, the model made a clear formal link between semantic memory structure and episodic 
experience. 
More recently, Griffiths, Steyvers, and Tenenbaum’s (2007) Topic model extended LSA in a 
Bayesian framework, specifying a generative mechanism by which latent semantic variables could 
produce the pattern of word co-occurrences across documents. The Topic model operates on the same 
initial data representation as LSA—it assumes that we experience words over discrete episodic contexts 
(operationalized as documents in a corpus). However, it specifies a cognitive inference process based 
on probabilistic reasoning to discover word meaning. To novice users of semantic models, the 
computational machinery of the Topic model can be daunting. However, the theoretical underpinning 
of the model is simple and elegant, and is based on the same idea posited for how children infer unseen 
causes for observable events. Consider an analogy: Given a set of co-occurring symptoms, a 
dermatologist must infer the unseen disease or diseases that led to the observed symptoms. Over many 
instances of the same co-occurring symptoms, she can infer the likelihood that they result from a 
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common cause. The topic model works in an analogous manner, but on a much larger scale of 
inference and with mixtures of causal variables. Given that certain words tend to co-occur in contexts 
and this pattern is consistent over many contexts, the model infers the likely latent “topics” that are 
responsible for the co-occurrence patterns, where the document is a probabilistic mixture of topics. A 
word’s meaning is a probability distribution over possible topics, where a topic is a probability 
distribution over words (just as a disease would be a probability distribution over symptoms, and a 
symptom is a probability distribution over possible diseases that produced it). 
This results in two key distinctions from LSA. First, the Topic model is generative in that it defines 
a process by which documents could be constructed from mixtures of mental variables. Second, a 
word’s representation is a probability distribution rather than a point in semantic space. This allows the 
Topic model to represent multiple meanings of ambiguous words, whereas in LSA, ambiguity is 
collapsed to a single point. The Topic model is able to account for free association data, sense 
disambiguation, word-prediction, and discourse effects that are problematic for LSA (Griffiths et al., 
2007). 
 
7.2.2. Passive Co-Occurrence Models. Passive co-occurrence models posit simple Hebbian type 
accumulation mechanisms that give rise to sophisticated semantic representations. Hence, these models 
tend not to need a full word-by-document matrix, but gradually develop semantic structure by simple 
co-occurrence “counting” as a text corpus is continuously experienced. 
The first passive co-occurrence model was the hyperspace analogue to language model (HAL; 
Lund & Burgess, 1996). HAL slides an n-word window across a text corpus, and counts the co-
occurrence frequency of words within the window (where frequency is inversely proportionate to 
distance between words in the window). A word’s semantic representation is a vector of distance-
weighted co-occurrence values to all other words in the corpus. Hence, a word is defined relative to 
other words in HAL. Comparing the vectors for two words yields their semantic similarity, producing 
both direct and indirect semantic relations as in LSA. HAL has accounted for a range of semantic 
priming phenomena (Lund & Burgess, 1996). Modern variants of HAL have improved the model to 
produce better fits to human data (Rhode, Gonnerman, & Plaut, 2009), and a HAL-like model was used 
by Mitchell et al. (2008) to predicted fMRI activation patterns associated with the meanings of concrete 
nouns. 
A second type of passive co-occurrence model uses the accumulation of random vectors as a 
mechanism for semantic abstraction (Jones, Kintsch, & Mewhort, 2006; Kanerva, 2009). For example, 
in the BEAGLE model (Jones & Mewhort, 2007) words are initially represented by random patterns of 
arbitrary dimensionality. Hence, before any episodic experience, the representation for apple is no 
more similar to peach than it is to staple. As text is experienced, each word’s memory pattern is 
updated as the sum of the random initial patterns representing the words with which it co-occurs. Thus, 
apple, peach, and core move closer to one another in semantic space as text is experienced, while 
staple moves away (but closer to paper, pencil, etc.). Random accumulation can be considered as 
semantic abstraction from the coincidental co-occurrence of (initially random) brain states representing 
the words in the episodic context. Because of the arbitrary nature of the features, BEAGLE can 
simultaneously learn about the positional information of words in the context similar to HAL-type 
models (Jones & Mewhort, 2007 use convolution to encode order information). Hence, a word’s 
representation becomes a pattern of arbitrary “features” that reflects its history of co-occurrence with, 
and position relative to, other words in contexts. BEAGLE simulates a number of phenomena including 
semantic priming, typicality, and semantic constraints in sentence completions. 
 
7.2.3. Retrieval-Based Models. Rather than assuming that humans store semantic representations, 
retrieval-based models construct meaning as part of episodic memory retrieval. Retrieval-based models 
are similar to exemplar-based theories of categorization (Nosofsky, 1986) and multiple-trace theories 
Semantic Memory 12 
 
of global memory (Hintzman, 1986). Just as Hintzman’s Minerva 2 model demonstrated that schema 
abstraction is simulated by a model containing only episodic traces, Kwantes’ (2005) constructed 
semantics model demonstrates that semantic phenomena are possible without requiring a semantic 
memory. In this model, memory is the episodic word-by-context matrix. When a word is read or heard, 
its semantic representation is constructed as an average of other words in memory, weighted by their 
contextual similarity to the target. Although semantic abstraction differs radically from LSA, similar 
representations are produced. Dennis (2005) has used a similar approach, accounting for an impressive 
array of semantic phenomena. 
 
7.3. Integrating Perceptual Information into Distributional Models 
Distributional models have been criticized as psychologically implausible because they learn from only 
linguistic information and do not contain information about sensorimotor perception contrary to 
grounded cognition (for a review, see de Vega, Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008). Hence, representations in 
distributional models are not a replacement for feature norms. Feature-based representations contain a 
great deal of sensorimotor features of words that cannot be learned from purely linguistic input, and 
both types of information are core to human semantic representation (Louwerse, 2008). Riordan and 
Jones (2011) recently compared a variety of feature-based and distributional models on semantic 
clustering tasks. Their results demonstrated that whereas there is information about word meaning 
redundantly coded in both feature norms and linguistic data, each has its own unique variance and the 
two information sources serve as complimentary cues to meaning. 
Research using recurrent networks trained on child-directed speech corpora has found that 
pretraining a network with features related to children’s sensorimotor experience produced 
significantly better word learning when subsequently trained on linguistic data (Howell, Jankowicz, & 
Becker, 2005). Durda, Buchanan, and Caron (2009) trained a feedforward network to associate LSA-
type semantic vectors with their corresponding activation of features from McRae et al.’s (2005) 
norms. Given the semantic representation for dog, the model attempts to activate the output feature 
<has fur> and inhibit the output feature for <made of metal>. After training, the network was able to 
infer the correct pattern of perceptual features for words that were not used in training because of their 
linguistic similarity to words that were used in training. 
A recent flurry of models using the Bayesian Topic model framework has also explored parallel 
learning of linguistic and featural information (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009; Baroni, Murphy, 
Barba, & Poesio, 2010; Steyvers, 2009). Given a word-by-document representation of a text corpus and 
a word-by-feature representation of feature production norms, the models learn a word’s meaning by 
simultaneously considering inference across documents and features. This enables learning from joint 
distributional information: If the model learns from the feature norms that sparrows have beaks, and 
from linguistic experience that sparrows and mockingbirds are distributionally similar, it infer that 
mockingbirds also have beaks, despite having no feature vector for mockingbird. Integration of 
linguistic and sensorimotor information allows the model to better fit human semantic data than a 
model trained with only one source (Andrews et al., 2009). This information integration is not unique 
to Bayesian models, but can also be accomplished within passive co-occurrence models (Jones & 
Recchia, 2010; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004) and retrieval-based models (Johns & Jones, 
in press). 
 
8. SUMMARY 
Over the past 25 years or so, semantic memory research has blossomed for a number of reasons, all of 
which are equally important. The generation of intriguing patient data and theories of the organization 
of semantic memory that resulted from them, and the acceptance of this patient research into what 
some might call mainstream cognitive psychology, was an important step. Furthermore, connectionist 
models of semantic processing enabled implementations of meaning-based computations, generating 
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new ideas, experiments, and simulations. The advent of neuroimaging methods allowed researchers to 
study semantic processing in the brain, to integrate neurally-based theories with those resulting from 
implemented models as well as normal adult and patient data, and to generate novel theories of 
semantic representation and processing. In addition, theories of grounded cognition added excitement 
and paved the way for a large number of novel experiments designed to test them. Finally, corpus-
based models of meaning have provided new ways to think about semantic representations, and a 
plethora of new ideas for designing experiments, and techniques for simulating human performance. 
The present high level of enthusiasm surrounding the study of semantic memory should continue as 
researchers refine, compare, and integrate theories, and test predictions that result from those 
theoretical endeavors. We hope that we have communicated some of this excitement to the reader. 
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